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Abstract. We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which
have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim is to describe
the equilibrium price formation and how the lack of information may affect the allocation of
resources. For it, we adapt to an asymmetric information scenario a variant of the Shapley-
Shubik game introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003).
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1 Introduction
We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite number of types of agents and commodities.
The economy extends over two periods and agents arrange contracts at the first period that
may be contingent on the realized state of nature in the second period. Agents have incomplete
information on a finite set of the states of nature and this information may differ across agents
(differential information economies). After the realization of the state of nature, a particular
agent do not necessarily know (or is unable to prove in a court of law) which state of nature
has actually occurred, (because, for example, she receives a signal that may be identical for
different states). Therefore they are restricted to sign contracts that are compatible with their
private information.
For these economies, Radner (1968) defined and established the existence of a notion of
Walrasian expectations equilibrium (or Radner equilibrium), an analogous concept to the Wal-
rasian equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu model with symmetric information.
Recently, there has been a resurgent interest on Walrasian expectations equilibrium and, in
parallel to the Arrow-Debreu model, questions concerning the existence and characterization
of Radner equilibrium by means of cooperative solutions has been obtained (see Allen and
Yannelis, 2001, Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz, 2001, Herve´s-Beloso, Moreno-Garc´ıa and Yannelis,
2005a and Herve´s-Beloso, Moreno-Garc´ıa and Yannelis, 2005b).
It is important to notice that in sharp contrast with others asymmetric information models,
as for example the rational expectations equilibrium model (Radner (1979)), in the framework
of Walrasian expectation equilibrium, it is assumed that prices do not reveal any private
information ex ante. They rather reflect agents’ informational asymmetries since they have
been obtained by maximizing utility taking into account the private information of each agent.
Our aim in this paper is to use a market-game approach to study the behavior of these
markets and to analyze the mechanism of price formation.
The wide literature on market games uses the principles of game theory to motivate or
justify the description of markets in which certain behavioral characteristics, such us price-
taking behavior, are assumed. Most of these works show how strategic interactions by rational
agents leads to a competitive equilibrium situation. One of the advantages of building a
strategic foundation for perfect competition is that we will be forced to describe the process
completely and explain how the market equilibrium is reached.
We remark that equilibrium price formation for economies with differential information
become particularly interesting due to the role which prices are called to play in this scenario.
As prices may differ in states of nature that an agent does not distinguish, prices affect not
only the allocation of wealth but also could affect the private information of the agent.
In order to explain the equilibrium price formation, we adapt a variant of the Shapley-
Shubik game introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003). We describe new rules for price
formation and the corresponding allocations, which underly the differentiated information
structures. First, we define a market game where the formation of price does not support
any informative role of prices. This mechanism allows to observe the equilibrium price forma-
3
tion and how the lack of information may affect the allocation of wealth.
One objection to the Radner model is that, since prices prices may be different in states of
nature that an agent does not distinguish, a price system may refine the private information
of such consumer. With this concern in mind, we describe a new game where the mechanism
specifying the price formation leads to a particular price system which is compatible with the
common information structure. We refer to this refinement as non-revealing Radner equili-
brium. (See Faias and Moreno-Garc´ıa (2008)). A non-revealing equilibrium price system, for
which we show an existence result, avoids this criticism and gives consistency to the model.
In fact, for both types of games we show existence of Nash equilibrium and then the corre-
sponding market equilibrium solutions (that is, Radner or Walrasian expectations equilibrium
and non-revealing Radner equilibrium, respectively) are obtained as a limit of a sequence of
Nash equilibria. We remark that these limit results provide new existence proofs for both,
Radner and non-revealing equilibria.
Our assumptions are the same as in Radner (1968), however, in order to obtain the existence
of the refinement called non-revealing Radner equilibrium, we require the compatibility of the
total endowment allocation with the common information. This additional assumption is
automatically fulfilled when the initial endowments do not depend on states of nature.
Regarding related work, Fugarolas et al. (2009) also undertake a non-cooperative approach
to differential information economies by extending Schmeidler’s (1980) work to the differential
information setting. However, as in Schmeidler’s result, the existence of Nash equilibrium is
obtained as a consequence of the existence of the Walrasian expectations equilibrium and, since
prices are included in the strategy sets, no explicit price formation rule is obtained.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the differential
information model and the notion of market equilibrium. In Section 3 we state an associated
game a la Shapley-Shubik and we prove existence of Nash equilibrium. In Section 4 we prove
that the limit of a sequence of Nash equilibria results in a Radner equilibrium. In Section
5, we define a new game where the price resulting from the interaction among consumers are
compatible with the common information structure. For this game we also show existence of
Nash equilibrium and, finally, a non-revealing equilibrium is obtained as limit of a sequence of
Nash equilibia.
2 The model
Let us consider an economy E with differential information. Let Ω be the set of states of nature
that describes the uncertainty. Ω is finite with cardinality k and there is a finite number of
goods, L, in each state. There is a a continuum of agents that trade the L commodities at
each state of nature ω ∈ Ω.
The private information structure of each agent is described by a partition of the set of
states Ω. Given a partition P of Ω, a commodity bundle x = (x(ω))ω∈Ω ∈ (IR`+)k is said to be
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P-measurable when it is constant on the elements of the partition .1
The set of agents is represented by the unit real interval I = [0, 1] =
n⋃
i=1
Ii, where Ii =[
i−1
n ,
i
n
)
, if i 6= n, and In =
[
n−1
n , 1
]
. We consider the Lebesgue measure µ on the Borel
subsets of I. Each agent t ∈ Ii is characterized by her private information Pt = Pi , her
initial endowments et = ei ∈ IRLk+ and preference relation over the consumption space, which
is represented by a utility function Ut = Ui : IRLk+ → IR+. We will refer to agents belonging to
the subinterval Ii as agents of type i.
The economy lasts for two periods τ = 0, 1. Consumption takes place at τ = 1. At τ = 0
there is uncertainty about the states of nature and the agents make contracts (agreements)
that are contingent on the realized state of nature that occurs at τ = 1. Thus, the contracts
are specified ex-ante.
An agent t ∈ Ii with information given by the partition Pi is not able to distinguish those
states of nature that are in the same element of Pi. Given a sate ω ∈ Ω, let Ei(ω) denote
the event in the partition Pi which contains the state ω. We say that a consumption bundle
x ∈ (IRL+)k is compatible with the information of agents of type i if, given any state ω, we have
x(ω) = x(ω′) for every ω′ ∈ Ei(ω). Let us denote by Xi the set which consists in the bundles
that are compatible with the information structure of agents of type i. That is,
Xi =
{
x ∈ (IRL+)k|x is Pi-measurable
}
.
We state the following assumptions:
(U) For every i the utility Ui is a continuous, concave and monotone2 function.
(E) ei  0 and ei ∈ Xi, i = 1, . . . , n. That is, every agent is initially endowed with strictly
positive amounts of every commodity and ei is Pi-measurable for every type i of con-
sumers.
An allocation x is a µ-integrable function that associates to each agent t a consumption
bundle xt. We refer to an allocation x as physically feasible if
∫
I
(xt − et)dµ(t) ≤ 0, and as
informationally feasible if xt ∈ Xi, for every t ∈ Ii and every i. A feasible allocation is both
physically and informationally feasible.
Each agent t ∈ I behaves as a price-taker and maximizes her utility functions restricted to
the allocations in her budget set. Given a price system p ∈ IRLk+ that specifies a commodity
price p(ω) ∈ IRL+ at each state ω ∈ Ω, the budget set of an agent of type i is given by
Bi(p) = {x ∈ Xi |
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · (x(ω)− ei(ω)) ≤ 0}.
Next we define a competitive equilibrium notion in the sense of Radner where traders must
balance the budget ex-ante. For it, we stress that although commodity prices, that agents
1That is, x(ω) = x(ω′), for all {ω, ω′} ⊆ S, for some S ∈ P.
2x y implies Ui(x) > Ui(y)
5
take as given, can be different across the states of nature, the market cannot communicate any
information through the price system .3
Definition 2.1 A pair (p, x), where p is a price system and x is a feasible allocation, is a
competitive or a Radner equilibrium if the bundle xt maximizes Ut on Bt(p), for almost all
t ∈ I.
Radner equilibrium is an ex ante concept. Notice that we assume free disposal. It is well
known that if we impose the condition of non-free disposal then a Radner equilibrium might not
exist with positive prices (see, for example, Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2003)). However,
allowing for negative prices one can dispense with the free disposal assumption.
Finally, given our atomless economy E , let us consider an economy En with a finite number
n of agents. In the differential information economy En each agent i is characterized by an
initial endowments ei, the utility funtion Ui and a private information structure given by the
partition Pi. We have that if (p, x) is a competitive equilibrium for the continuum economy
E then (p, z) is a competitive equilibrium for En, where the allocation z = (zi, i = 1, . . . n)
is given by zi =
1
µ(Ii)
∫
Ii
xtdµ(t). Reciprocally, if (p, z) is a competitive equilibrium for the
economy En with n consumers, then (p, x) is a competitive equilibrium for E where x is the
step function given by xt = zi for every consumer t ∈ Ii. Therefore, if we consider an economy
with n consumers associated to the n-type continuum economy then the equilibrium solutions
for the continuum and the discrete approach are equivalent (see Herve´s-Beloso et. al, 2005, for
details)
3 An Associated Game a la Shapley-Shubik
Following Shapley-Shubik (1977) approach each commodity in each state of nature is traded
at a trade-post, so there is a post for each commodity in each state of nature. Each consumer
deliver to the post the endowment of commodity ` in each state ω ∈ Ω for sale and fiat money
to purchase the consumption goods. Consumers place their entire initial bundle for sale and
then each post for commodity ` in the state ω receives the corresponding total endowment in
the economy, i.e., e`(ω) =
∫
I
e`t(ω)dµ(t). As in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003) and in order to
trigger the market we assume that and external agent place 1 unit of fiat money at each post.
3As in Maus (2004), we may argue that agents do not infer any new information from prices.
Consumers observe prices according to their action possibilities, which are determined by their
private information. Consider an agent with information given by P and let E be an event,
that is, E is a subset of state that such a consumer cannot differentiate. Let #E denote the
cardinality of the event E. Then this agent perceives the price system p under her information
P as (p(E))E∈Pi , with p(E) representing the same observed price in each state belonging to
the event E ∈ Pi, given by the average price 1#E
∑
w∈E
p(ω).
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The trading-posts and the bank, that borrows at zero price the fiat money and put in each
trading post one unit of money, are dummy players. They have no choices to make and so,
they do not optimize.
In our scenario, consumers deliver to a central post the endowment of every commodity `
in each state ω ∈ Ω for sale and, in addition, the individuals choose strategies that precise the
amount of fiat money to purchase the corresponding consumption goods. Since a particular
consumer may be not able to distinguish all the sates of nature, the central post (playing
also the role of an additional dummy agent) deliver in each of the k × l trading posts the
corresponding initial endowments and fiat money of each agent.
The strategic variable of each agent is the amount of fiat money that she wants to spend
in each commodity. Precisely, to purchase commodity ` at the state ω each agent t deliver to
the post fiat money θ`t(ω) that she borrows at zero interest. In order to have compact strategy
sets we impose an upper bound on borrowing. Thus, each agent can not borrow more than M
units of fiat money. Therefore, the strategy set of each consumer t ∈ I is given by the set
ξt(M) = ξ(M) = {θ ∈ IRLk+ such that
∑
ω∈Ω
L∑
`=1
θ`(ω) ≤M}.
We remark that, in this setting, the role of money is just “means of payment”.
Prices are determined by the actions of traders. Actually, given a strategy profile Θ =
(θt, t ∈ I), the price for each commodity ` in each state of nature ω ∈ Ω arises in each post
according to the next rule:
p`(ω) =
θ`(ω) + 1
e`(ω)
> 0,
where θ`(ω) =
∫
I
θ`t(ω)dµ(t). Let p(Θ) = (p
`(ω), ω ∈ Ω, ` = 1, . . . , L).
Each agent t receives a bundle compatible with her information structure which means that
the consumption bundle is constant in the states that belong to the same event. Let us consider
an agent t ∈ Ii, and recall that Ei(ω) denote the event in the partition Pi which contains the
state ω. The amount of commodity ` assigned to an individual t ∈ Ii in the sate ω is given by:
x`t(ω) = min
{
θ`t(ω
′)
p`(ω′)
, ω′ ∈ Ei(ω)
}
.
Let xt(Θ) = (x`t(ω), ω ∈ Ω, ` = 1, . . . , L) be the bundle allocated to consumer t when Θ is
the strategy profile.
The agent t ∈ Ii also receives money from the sale of her endowment, thus, his net deficit
is given by,
dt(Θ) =
∑
ω∈Ω
L∑
`=1
θ`t(ω)−
∑
ω∈Ω
L∑
`=1
p`(ω)e`t(ω).
The payoff of each agent t ∈ Ii for each strategy profile Θ is,
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Πt(Θ) = Ui(xt(Θ))− dt+(Θ),
where dt+ = max{0, dt}. The use of maximum to define the payoff function means that agents
do not ascribe utility to fiat money, but are penalized in the case of default.
Now, let us show that the mechanism that we propose guarantees that for every strategy
profile the resulting allocation of commodities is feasible, that is, physically and information-
ally feasible. Note that the informational feasibility follows trivially since for each agent the
mechanism assigns the same bundle in states that belong to the same event of the private
partition. The final allocation for agents is physically feasible, in fact, for every commodity
` = 1, . . . , L and every state ω ∈ Ω, the following inequality holds
∫
I
x`t(ω)dµ(t) ≤
∫
I
θ`t(ω)
p`(ω)
dµ(t) =
∫
I
θ`t(ω)
θ`(ω) + 1
e`(ω)dµ(t) ≤ e`(ω).
Let G(M) ≡ {(Πt, ξt(M)) = ξ(M), t ∈ I} denote the game previously described. Given a
strategy profile Θ : I → ξ(M) we denote by Θ \ αt the strategy profile which coincides with Θ
except for player t who chooses αt instead of Θ(t). A strategy profile Θ is a Nash equilibrium
in the game G(M) if for almost all t ∈ I we have Πt(Θ) ≥ Πt(Θ \αt) whatever αt ∈ ξ(M) may
be.
Before showing a Nash equilibrium existence result for the game G(M), we state a Lemma
obtaining a property of these equilibria that will be used in the convergence result presented
in the next section.
Lemma 3.1 If the profile Θ = (θt, t ∈ I) is a Nash equilibrium for the game G(M), then for
every commodity ` and type i we have
θ`t(ω)
p`(ω)
=
θ`t(ω¯)
p`(ω¯)
for any ω ∈ Ei(ω¯) for almost all t ∈ Ii.
Proof. Assume that the statement of the Lemma does not hold. Then there exist a Nash
equilibrium Θ = (θt, t ∈ I) and a positive measure set J of agents of a type j such that, for
every t ∈ J ⊂ Ij one has θ
`
t(ω)
p`(ω)
6= θ
`
t(ω¯)
p`(ω¯)
for some commodity ` and some states ω and ω¯ such
that ω ∈ Ej(ω¯)4 For each t ∈ J, and each commodity ` let A`t be the set of states at which the
minimum of
{
θ`t(ω)
p`(ω)
with ω ∈ Ej(ω¯)
}
is attained. Recall that one player is not able to alter
the price by modifying her strategy unilaterally. For each t ∈ J let us consider a strategy αt
given by
α`t(ω) =

θ`t(ω) if ω does not belong to Ej(ω¯)
θ`t(ω)− εt if ω does not belong to A`t
θ`t(ω) + δt if ω belongs to A
`
t
We can choose εt > 0 and δt > 0 in such a way that dt(Θ) = dt(Θ \ αt) and
min
{
α`t(ω)
p`(ω)
with ω ∈ Ej(ω¯)
}
> min
{
θ`t(ω)
p`(ω)
with ω ∈ Ej(ω¯)
}
.
4The commodity ` and the states ω and ω¯ may depend on t.
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Therefore, every player t ∈ J has an incentive to deviate from the profile Θ which is a contra-
diction with the conditions of Nash Equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
A strategy profile Θ is called symmetric if every agent of the same type selects the same
strategy, that is, Θ(t) = θi for every t ∈ Ii. If it is the case, we write Θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ (ξ(M))n.
Theorem 3.1 For every M ∈ IR+ the set of symmetric Nash equilibria for the game G(M) is
non-empty.
Proof. Let Bt be a correspondence which associates to each symmetric strategy profile the
best replies of the player t ∈ I. That is, given the strategy profile Θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ (ξ(M))n
Bt(Θ) = arg max
αt∈ξ(M)
Πt(Θ \ αt)
Note that, by symmetry, Bt is the same for every player t ∈ Ii and we denote Bi. By
definition, p(Θ) = p(Θ \ αt) which allows us to obtain that xt(Θ \ αt) is concave in αt and
dt(Θ \ αt) is linear in αt. Then, by assumption (U), we have that the payoff function Πt is
concave in the strategy selected by player t. This implies that Bt takes non-empty-convex values
provided that ξ(M) is a convex and compact set.
Moreover, the payoff function Πt is a continuous function. Then, the maximun theorem al-
lows us to conclude that the correspondence Bi, from ξ(M))n to ξ(M), is upper semi-continuous
for every i = 1, . . . , n.
Finally, let us consider the correspondence B = (B1, . . . ,Bn). By Kakutani’s theorem B has
a fixed point, which actually is a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
4 Radner equilibrium as a limit of a sequence
of Nash equilibria
In this section, we show that a Radner equilibrium can be obtained as the limit of a se-
quence of prices and allocations resulting from the sequence of symmetric Nash equilibria
of the games G(M) when M goes to infinity. For it, given a price system p ∈ IRLk+ , let
‖p‖ ≡∑ω∈Ω∑L`=1 p`(ω).
Theorem 4.1 For each integer M, let ΘM = (θM,t, t ∈ I), be the a symmetric Nash equi-
librium for the game G(M). Let (p(M), x(M)) be the corresponding sequence of prices and
allocations which is defined by this sequence of Nash equilibria. Then, there exists a subse-
quence of (p(M)/‖p(M)‖, x(M)) which converges to a price system p and an allocation x, such
that (p, x) is an equilibrium for the economy E .
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Proof. Since ΘM = (θM,t, t ∈ I) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium for the game G(M), we
have θM,t = θM,i for every t ∈ Ii and every type i of players. This equilibrium define the
prices p(M) = (p`M (ω), ` = 1, . . . , L, ω ∈ Ω) which leads to the allocation x(M) = (xi(M), i =
1, . . . , n) and net deficits (di(M), i = 1, . . . , n).
The definition of the game ensures that
∫
I
xt(M)dµ(t) =
n∑
i=1
µ(Ii)xi(M) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi(M) ≤ e =
n∑
i=1
µ(Ii)ei =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ei.
The remaining endowment at the trading post e−
∫
I
xt(M)dµ(t) is delivered to the external
agent. Thus, the consumption bundles allocated to consumers are uniformly bounded.
Note that if a player selects the strategy θ = 0 then she spends and consumes nothing.
This implies that Ui(e)−di+(M) ≥ Ui(xi(M))−di+(M) ≥ Ui(0) and then di+(M) is bounded
from above by Ui(e)− Ui(0).
Now, for each M let us consider the sets of types defined as follows:
D(M) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that di(M) > 0} and
S(M) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that di(M) < 0}.
That is, D(M) is the subset of types agents who are in deficit and S(M) is the set of agents
who are in surplus. It holds trivially the next equality
n∑
i=1
di(M) =
∑
i∈D(M)
di(M) +
∑
i∈S(M)
di(M).
On the other hand, 0 = Lkn+
n∑
i=1
di(M) = Lkn−
∑
i∈S(M)
−di(M) +
∑
i∈D(M)
di(M), which
implies that
∑
i∈S(M)
−di(M) = Lkn+
∑
i∈D(M)
di(M) is also uniformly bounded from above.
Since di+(M) is uniformly bounded it it follows that so is −di(M). Finally, we can conclude
that di(M) is uniformly bounded.
Thus if we consider a sequence (xi(M), di(M), i = 1, . . . , n)M withM converging to infinity,
there exists a converging subsequence with limit (xi, di, i = 1, . . . , n).We write xi(M)→ xi and
di(M)→ di, for each type i.Moreover, the sequence p(M)‖p(M)‖ has also a convergent subsequence
with limit p. We write , xi(M)→ xi, di(M)→ di, for each type i, and p(M)‖p(M)‖ → p.
We remark that since xi(M) belongs to Xi for every M and every i, the limit allocation x
is informationally feasible, that is, xi is Pi-measurable for every type i of agents. It remains
to show that (p, (xt)t∈I), with xt = xi for every t ∈ Ii is a Radner equilibrium.
Since L > 0 the set S(M) is nonempty. Moreover, every agent of type i in S(M) must
be bidding all the money that they can borrow. Otherwise, such an agent could increase the
bidding in every commodity in each state of nature what entails a strictly increase in the
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consumption quantities of his bundle without incurring any default, and by consequence her
payoff will increase which contradict the fact that we are in a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Since any agent of type i ∈ S(M) is in surplus we have that p(M)ei > M which implies
‖p(M)‖ → ∞ when M →∞.
Recall that the allocation x(M) is defined as
x`M,i(ω¯) = min
{
θ`M,i(ω)
p`M (ω)
, ω ∈ Ei(ω¯)
}
.
The Lemma 3.1, stated in the previous section, allows us to ensure that minimum above
considered is attained at every ω ∈ Ei(ω¯), that is
θ`M,i(ω)
p`M (ω)
=
θ`M,i(ω¯)
p`M (ω¯)
, for every ω ∈ Ei(ω¯), i = 1, . . . n.
Then, we conclude that actually x`M,i(ω) =
θ`M,i(ω)
p`M (ω)
, that is θ`M,i(ω) = p
`
M (ω)x
`
M,i(ω).
Now, we can write
di(M)
‖p(M)‖ =
∑
ω∈Ω
L∑
`=1
θ`M,i(ω)−
∑
ω∈Ω
L∑
`=1
p`M (ω)e
`
i(ω)
‖p(M)‖
=
∑
ω∈Ω
L∑
`=1
p`M (ω)x
`
M,i(ω)−
∑
ω∈Ω
L∑
`=1
p`M (ω)e
`
i(ω)
‖p(M)‖
=
p(M)
‖p(M)‖ (xi(M)− ei)
Since ‖p(M)‖ → ∞ and di(M) is uniformly bounded for every type i, it follows that
p(M)
‖p(M)‖ (xi(M)− ei)→ 0, that is, p(xi − ei) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Note that pxi = pei > 0, provided that ei  0. To finish the proof, let us show that
Ui(y) ≤ Ui(xi) for any bundle y ∈ Bi(p) for every i. For it, let us take any real number
λ ∈ (0, 1) and a bundle y ∈ Bi(p). Then, λpy ≤ λpei = λpxi < pxi. This implies that
pM
‖p(M)‖λy <
pM
‖p(M)‖xi(M) and thus p(M)λy < p(M)xi(M) ≤M, for allM large enough. For
each M, let us consider the strategy given by α`M (ω) = p
`
Mλy
`(ω). Note that
∑
ω∈Ω
L∑
`=1
α`M (ω) =
p(M)λy and then αM ∈ ξ(M). By selecting αt = αM , we have
dt(ΘM \ αt) =
[
L∑
`=1
α`M − p(M)
]
+
≤ [p(M)xi(M)− p(M)ei]+ = dt(ΘM ),
for any t ∈ Ii. Therefore, since ΘM is a Nash equilibrium, Ui(xi(M)) ≥ Ui(λy). Finally, passing
to the limit and observing that λ < 1 was arbitrary, we conclude that Ui(xi) ≥ Ui(y).
Q.E.D.
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5 Non-revealing equilibrium
In the previous sections we have considered that contracts are made ex-ante and prices, al-
though can differ for different states, do not reveal information to agents. In this Section, we
show an existence result of equilibrium where prices are measurable with respect the common
information structure, that is, we show that the set of non-revealing equilibria is non-empty.
Consider again, as before, a differential information economy E with a continuum of agents
but a finite number of types. Each agent t ∈ Ii is is characterized by the private information
Pi , initial endowments ei ∈ IRLk+ and preference relation over the consumption space, which is
represented by a utility function Ui : IRLk+ → IR+.
Let PC denote the associated common information, which is the meet of the partitions
(Pi, i = 1, . . . , n), and we write PC =
∧n
i=1 Pi5. Then, E is said to be a common information
event if Ei(ω) ⊂ E for every state w ∈ E and for every type i of agents. Note that {ω} ∈ PC if
and only if Ei(ω) = {ω} for every i or, equivalently, information does not lead directly to any
consumption restriction at the state ω for any agent.
Let us consider a price system p which is PC-measurable. That is, p(ω) = p(ω′) for any
ω′ ∈ E(ω), where E(ω) is the common information event that contains ω. We remark that if
prices are considered to have an informative role, then these prices that are PC-measurable are
precisely the prices that do not reveal any information to agents. In other words, if consumers
could refine their information through prices, the only price systems which do not provide
any additional information to any consumer are those which are compatible with the common
information structure.
Next, we precise a non-informational equilibrium solution defined by prices that are com-
patible with the common information.
Definition 5.1 A non-revealing equilibrium for the economy E with differential information
is a price system p and a feasible allocation of commodities x such that
(i) the commodity price system p is PC-measurable,
(ii) every agent t ∈ I maximizes Ut on the budget constraint Bt(p) and
(iii)
∫
I
xt(ω)dµ(t) ≤
∫
I
et(ω)dµ(t) for every state ω.
Note, as we have already remarked, in this case equilibrium prices actually do not reveal
any information to consumers provided that we just consider non-enlightening prices, i.e.,
equilibrium prices are required to be compatible with the common information PC .
5The meet is the largest σ-algebra which is contained in each σ-algebra generated by Pi,
for every i. That is, PC is the finest partition of the set of states that is coarser than each Pi.
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5.1 A new market game with a non-enlightening prices
rule: existence of Nash equilibium
In this subsection we define a sequence of market games associated to the economy E , with a new
price formation rule leading to non-enlightening prices, that is, prices which are compatible with
the common information PC . Thus, these games will allow us to deal with market equilibrium
where prices might acquire an informative role and then address the problem of existence of
non-revealing equilibrium, where prices are PC-measurable and therefore consumers cannot
infer any additional information from prices.
We use the same notation stated in the Sections 3 and 4. As in the previous game G(M),
let us state an upper bound M on borrowing for fiat money. The new game GNR(M) with
non-revealing price formation is defined by the same strategy sets as G(M) but differs form
it in the payoff functions since the mechanism defining prices and allocations are modified as
follows:
Given a strategy profile Θ = (θt, t ∈ I) and a sate ω the price for the commodity ` in this
state is given by
p`(ω) = max
{
θ`(ω′) + 1
e`(ω′)
, ω′ ∈ E(ω)
}
6
In this case, the amount of commodity ` assigned to an individual t ∈ Ii in the state ω is
given by:
x`t(ω) = min
{
θ`t(ω
′)
p`(ω′)
, ω′ ∈ Ei(ω)
}
=
1
p`(ω)
min
{
θ`t(ω
′), ω′ ∈ Ei(ω)
}
,
where the last equality is due to the fact that p is PC-measurable, which implies that p is
Pi-measurable for every i = 1, . . . , n.
As in G(M) agents do not ascribe utility to fiat money, but are penalized in the case of
default. To define the penalizations in this new game, let us define for each common information
event E the function dEt as follows:
dEt (Θ) = #E
L∑
`=1
max
ω∈E
{
θ`t(ω)
}−∑
ω∈E
L∑
`=1
p`(ω)e`t(ω),
where #E denotes the cardinal of E. For each agent t ∈ I, the penalizations in the non-revealing
game is given by dt+(Θ), being
dt(Θ) =
∑
E∈PC
dEt (Θ).
Then the payoff of each agent t ∈ Ii for each strategy profile Θ is Πt(Θ) = Ui(xt(Θ)) −
dt+(Θ), where xt(Θ) and dt+(Θ) are, respectively, the bundle and penalizations previously
defined.
6We remark that if the initial allocation e is PC-measurable, then the price rule can be
recasted as p`(ω) =
1
e`(ω)
(
1 + max
{
θ`(ω′), ω′ ∈ E(ω)})
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Lemma 5.1 If the profile Θ = (θt, t ∈ I) is a Nash equilibrium for the game GNR(M), then
θt is Pi-measurable for almost all agent t ∈ Ii and every type i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. Assume that the statement of the Lemma does not hold. Then there exist a Nash
equilibrium Θ = (θt, t ∈ I) and a positive measure set J of agents of a type j such that, for
every t ∈ J ⊂ Ij one has that θt is not Pj-measurable. That is, for every t ∈ J one has
θt(ω) 6= θt(ω¯) for some states ω and ω¯ such that ω ∈ Ej(ω¯). Hence for each t ∈ J, we have
θ`t(ω) 6= θ`t(ω¯) for some commodity `.7 For each t ∈ J and each commodity ` let H`t be the set
of states at which the minimum of
{
θ`t(ω) with ω ∈ Ej(ω¯)
}
is attained. For each t ∈ J let us
consider a strategy αt given by
α`t(ω) =

θ`t(ω) if ω does not belong to Ej(ω¯)
θ`t(ω)− εt if ω does not belong to H`t
θ`t(ω) + δt if ω belongs to H
`
t
We can choose εt > 0 and δt > 0 in such a way that dt(Θ) ≥ dt(Θ \ αt)8 and
min
{
α`t(ω) with ω ∈ Ej(ω¯)
}
> min
{
θ`t(ω) with ω ∈ Ej(ω¯)
}
.
On the other hand, we have that p(Θ) = p(Θ \ αt) provided that if an agent modifies her
strategy unilaterally, the price system does not change. Therefore, every player t ∈ J has an
incentive to deviate from the profile Θ which is a contradiction with the conditions of Nash
Equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 5.1 For every M ∈ IR+ the set of symmetric Nash equilibria for the game GNR(M)
is non-empty.
We omit the proof of this Theorem, since it follows as the proof of Theorem 3.1. which
shows the existence result of symmetric Nash equilibrium for the game G(M).
5.2 Non-revealing equilibrium as limit of Nash equilibria
In which follows, we show that a non-revealing equilibrium of the economy E can be obtained as
a limit of a sequence of prices and allocations which results from a sequence of Nash equilibria.
For it, we state the following assumption:
7As in the proof of Lemma 3.1, the states ω and ω′ and the commodity ` may depend on t.
8Let Ht denote the set of states in Ej(ω¯) which do not belong to H`t and # denotes
cardinal of the corresponding set. Note that Ei(ω¯) ⊆ E(ω¯), where E(ω¯) is the common
information event which contains ω¯. Then, we can take δt in such a way that δt ≤ εt#Ht#H`t
and
max
ω∈H`t
{
θ`t(ω) + δt
} ≤ max
ω∈E(ω¯)
{
θ`t(ω)
}
since this last maximum is not attained in H`t .
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(M) The total initial endowment e =
∑n
i=1 ei
n
is PC-measurable.
Theorem 5.2 For each integer M, let ΘM = (θM,t, t ∈ I), be the a symmetric Nash equili-
brium for the game GNR(M). Let (p(M), x(M)) be the corresponding sequence of prices and
allocations which is defined by this sequence of Nash equilibria. Then, there exists a subse-
quence of (p(M)/‖p(M)‖, x(M)) which converges to a price system p and an allocation x, such
that (p, x) is a non-revealing equilibrium for the economy E .
Proof. To show this result, we can adapt the same proof of Theorem 4.1 taking into account
that the following assertions are verified:
(i) Since e is compatible with the common information structure PC , the definition of the
price formation rule in the game GNR(M) allows us to obtain the physical feasibility of
x(M) provided that the next inequalities hold
n∑
i=1
x`M,i(ω) =
n∑
i=1
θ`M,i(ω)
p`M (ω)
=
n∑
i=1
θ`M,i(ω)
max
ω′∈E(ω)
1 + θ`M (ω
′)
e`(ω′)
=
n∑
i=1
θ`M,i(ω)
1 + max
ω′∈E(ω)
θ`M (ω
′)
e`(ω) ≤
n∑
i=1
θ`M,i(ω)
1 + θ`M (ω)
e`(ω)
≤ ne`(ω),
where the first equality follows by applying Lemma 5.1. whereas the third equality is
implied by the Pc-measurability of e which requires e(ω) = e(ω′) for any ω′ ∈ E(ω).
(ii) Each x(M) is informationally feasible and then the limit allocation is also information-
ally feasible.
(iii) Applying lemma 5.1, we obtain that θM,i(ω) = θM,i(ω′) for any ω′ ∈ Ei(ω), for every
type i.
(iv) The price formation rule in GNR(M) allows us to ensure
n∑
i=1
∑
ω∈Ω
L∑
`=1
p`(ω)e`i(ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
L∑
`=1
p`(ω)
n∑
i=1
e`i(ω)
=
∑
ω∈Ω
L∑
`=1
nmax
ω∈E
{
θ`(ω) + 1
}
=
∑
ω∈Ω
L∑
`=1
max
ω∈E
{
n∑
i=1
θ`i (ω) + n
}
≥
∑
E∈PC
L∑
`=1
n∑
i=1
#Emax
ω∈E
{
θ`i (ω)
)− Ln ∑
E∈PC
#E
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Then, by the definition of the penalizations, we have the following inequality:∑
i∈S(M)
−di(M) ≤ Ln
∑
E∈PC
#E +
∑
i∈D(M)
di
Therefore, we can conclude that the sequence of di(M) is uniformly bounded.
(v) The definition of the mechanism of price formation allows us to ensure that each p(M)
is PC-measurable and then the limit of the convergent subsequence is also a non-
enlightening price system.
Q.E.D.
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